Abstract. In this paper I aim to state the nature of the humanities, contrasting them with the natural sciences. I argue that, compared with the natural sciences, the humanities have their own objects, their own aims, and their own methods.
earth revolves around its axis" means something, it means the same as the Dutch sentence "De aarde draait om haar as". Sometimes it is difficult to tell what the meaning of a sentence is, for instance when it concerns a topic you are not familiar with, or when you don't know some of the technical terminology that is used. If we want to understand such sentence, we try to find a sentence that expresses the same meaning, but, for us, clearer.
Sentence meaning is one kind of meaning falling under the umbrella "meaning that derives from human conventions, human intentions and/or from human purposive behaviour", as the meaning of a sentence derives from human conventions about word meaning, grammar, and pragmatics.
It goes without saying that not each and every object with sentence meaning is an object of humanistic inquiry. Many sentences that are uttered and written down will never be the object of anything that merits the description 'humanistic inquiry'.
Still, sentences are among such objects. Sometimes they are such objects because they seem important while at the same time obscure, and hence in need of clarification.
Such inquiry focuses on the meaning of the sentence and is exegetical in nature. Other times it is not the meaning of a sentence that is the object of humanistic study, but its structure; such inquiry is grammatical in nature.
The natural sciences don't and can't study these objects, as they are blind to sentence meaning. There is no natural science we can turn to when we want to know the meaning of a sentence.
[b] Word meaning. Words have meaning.
9 'To procrastinate', for instance, means 'to put things off'. When we don't know the meaning of a word, we look it up in a dictionary where we find more or less helpful synonyms for it.
Word meanings also fall under the broad umbrella of "meaning that derives from human conventions, human intentions and/or from human purposive behaviour", as the meaning of a word derives from human conventions.
It goes without saying that not each and every object with word meaning is an object of humanistic inquiry. In the ordinary run of things we normally know what words mean. Still, words are among the objects of the humanities. Word meanings are studied by lexicologists. However, it is not only the meaning of words that is the object of humanistic study. Word forms are also studied; morphologists and historical grammarians do this.
The natural sciences, again, have no handle on word meaning and word form, and hence cannot contribute to their study. Speaker's meaning, as I will be using the term, encompasses more than Gricean "conversational implicatures". It also encompasses illocutionary act intentions and perlocutionary act intentions. Here I am drawing on the theory of speech acts that was given its initial form by J.L. Austin. 11 By way of explanation, when the prime minister said "Jack won't be released", she said that, let us suppose, in order to calm down the opposition. She intended her words to have that calming effect. The intended effect of her words are her "perlocutionary intentions". For understanding what someone said it is often quite relevant to know such intentions.
Speakers also have "illocutionary intentions". Suppose Agnes spoke the words "Alzheimer's disease is the next medical tsunami", then how must her words be taken? Is she quoting someone, is she making an announcement, or is she making a prediction? She may have had any of these intentions. But to her hearers it will be quite important to know which of these "illocutionary intentions" she in fact had. To understand what a speaker said, it will generally be quite important to know what the speaker's illocutionary intentions were.
Speaker's meaning can be attached to sentences, but also to larger linguistic wholes, such as speeches, articles, books.
In many cases, in many contexts, we don't need specialized scholarship in order to (get to) know a speaker's meaning. But sometimes we do. Such speaker's meanings are potential objects of the humanities.
Speaker's meaning also falls under the broad umbrella of "meaning that commemorate, to edify, to warn, to amuse… Mutatis mutandis the same is true of music, dances and the dramatic performances: their makers had intentions (analogues of illocutionary and perlocutionary intentions) that they aimed to realize through these works. These intentions are the maker's meaning.
Maker's meaning, of which speaker's meaning is one variety, fits the broad umbrella of "meaning that derives from human conventions, human intentions and/or from human purposive behaviour". For maker's meaning is the intention that the maker meant to realize through making the work; works of art, and artefacts in general, are the products of purposive human behaviour.
Many maker's meanings will never be the object of anything that qualifies as humanistic research. Still, if a thing has maker's meaning it is a potential object of such inquiry.
[e] Functional meaning. Humans make pottery, cutlery, ovens, tables, beds, clothes, and numerous other sorts of artefacts, such as laws and regulations, organizations and societal structures. These things are made with a purpose and made for a purpose. Pottery is made for the purpose of storing and cooking food in; cutlery is made for the purpose of civilized eating; laws and regulations are made for the purpose of structuring society, etc. These artefacts have meanings-the meanings being the functions they were intended to perform. I call this their functional meaning.
The functional meanings of human made artefacts fit under the umbrella of "meaning that derives from human conventions, human intentions and/or from human purposive behaviour". This kind of meaning derives from human intentions and from human purposive behaviour; without these, these things wouldn't even exist.
Here too there are many things with functional meanings that never have been, or will become, the object of humanistic study. Still, such meanings are possible objects of such studies. Archaeological study of shards of pottery is an instance of such study-at least when the aim is to find out the functional meaning of the shards.
[ viz. that texts may express thoughts and ideas that their authors were unaware of (and aren't due to false consciousness).
We here approach one way in which Wilhelm Dilthey sought to delineate the objects of the humanities. 14 Human beings, he said, experience things. Moreover, they express their experiences in poems, in books, in gestures, in works of art, etc. These expressions are 'objectifications' of private experiences, they take on an objective existence in the world of culture, and thus become in principle accessible to others.
The objects of the humanities are objectified expressions of human experiences. The objects of the sciences lack this character. Neither the rising of a mercury column, nor the speckles on a person's skin express experiences.
Objectifications of human experiences have expressive/indicative meaning too-they are indications and expressions of experiences. These meanings too fit the broad umbrella of "meaning that derives from human conventions, human intentions and/or from human purposive behaviour", as the objectifications are the products of human intentions and of purposive behaviour.
Of course, not all objectifications will need humanistic scholarly treatment in order for their meaning to be captured. And not all will have this kind of meaning.
13 Girard discusses works by Proust, Standhal, Flaubert, Cervantes, and Dostoyevski. See Girard 1965. 14 Dilthey 1927: 79-88. Alasdair MacIntyre, may be thought of as a coherent but complex form of socially established human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve standards of excellence that are appropriate to and partly definitive of that form of activity. 16 "Goods internal to" a practise, are the "aims" of that practise. The goods internal to the humanities, as I will argue in this section, are different from the goods internal of the sciences.
Before doing that, however, I note that practise-internal aims must be distinguished from whatever it is that motivates people to engage in the practice in the first place. People can be motivated for engaging in the humanities or in the sciences by intellectual curiosity, or by the wish to show to others that they can take on an intellectual challenge, or by the wish to do something respectable, or by the wish to boost one's ego, or by the wish to be part of a social group, or by the wish to make money. None of these or other motivations have (or perhaps I should say: should have) a bearing on the practise-internal aims of the humanities or the sciences.
What, then, are the aims internal to the humanities? As will become immediately clear, a truly bewildering array of aims can be distinguished. As will also become clear, sometimes those aims can be attained inside and other times outside of a scholarly context. In some cases these aims are attained routinely, in other cases their attainment requires protracted scholarly effort. It is mostly only when the aims are attained within a scholarly context that we speak of the humanities. Something similar is true of the aims of the sciences: sometimes these aims can be attained outside of academic and laboratory contexts, but other times they can't. In some cases the aims of the natural sciences can be attained routinely, in other cases their attainment requires extensive research and hi-tech laboratories. It is mostly only when the aims are attained within an academic setting that we speak of science. Susan
Haack once said that science is "the long arm of common sense" 17 ; I say that the humanities are another long arm of common sense. Many of the ordinary quotidian aims we have, and many of the ways of finding things out, are continued and sharpened in both the humanities and the sciences.
Orienting myself to the various kinds of objects that were delineated in the previous section, I will now list a number of the aims of, the internal goods of, the 16 MacIntyre 1985 : 187. 17 Haack 2007 humanities. Since the humanities are a huge and living thing that is moreover in constant flux of development, the list cannot possibly lay claim to completeness.
With respect to [a] , sentence meaning, the aims include: (i) understanding the meaning of sentences in a language, especially sentences that seem puzzling or even obscure to us; (ii) explicating the syntactic rules that underlie well-formed meaningful sentences in a language; (iii) tracing syntactic changes and developments over time;
(iv) explaining how syntaxis is learned by children and second-language users.
Concerning [b] , word meaning, the aims include: (i) explicating the meanings of words in a language; (ii) tracing shifts in word meaning in a language over time;
(iii) explaining changes in the pronunciation of words in a language; (iv) explain why certain words became popular, while others receded into obscurity.
As Saying that the humanities aim at propositional truth is a claim of some momentum, as many working in the humanities eschew talk of truth and put a lot of emphasis on 'subjectivity', 'situatedness', and 'relativity'. 26 However, in actual practice truth-relevant considerations do play an important role in the humanities.
This is the way it should be. For the humanities must be veritistic, if they are to be at all. Very generally speaking, a method is a set of rules to be applied in the interest of securing a certain result. The results aimed at can be broadly practical: one set of rules may be applied so as to build a house, another so as to fight a nasty germ, yet another so as to select the best candidate. The results aimed at can also be broadly theoretical: one set of rules may be applied so as to find out the height of a mountain, another set so as to establish the probability that some event will take place, yet another set so as to find out what it was that an author wanted to say by means of his text, still another set so as detecting the value of something, etc.
The Methods of the Humanities
Philosophy of science text books usually discuss deductivism, inductivism and falsificationism as scientific methods. 28 Deductive methods include such rules:
"formulate axioms or first principles of a certain field of study and make sure these axioms are perfectly evident (and a proposition is evident when only a little attention is needed to recognize it is true); next, prove propositions that are even slightly obscure, by deducing them from the axioms and propositions that have already been proved; third, treat things as much as possible in their natural order, beginning with the most simplest and most general, and explain everything belonging to the nature of the genus before proceeding to particular species." 29 Deductivism has worked fine for mathematics, but as a method for doing empirical research it was seriously flawed.
Inductivist methods, by contrast, don't include rules having to do with stating axioms, or first principles. Rather, they include such rules as: "first, collect data in an unprejudiced way; next, organize the data in a perspicuous way, free from presuppositions and constraints; then, through induction, distil correct generalizations and explanatory principles out of the organized data." 30 Inductivism doesn't work well for the empirical sciences: we need selection principles for finding data (for not all data are relevant for the purposes at hand); moreover, we need principles to organize the data (data don't organize themselves); and most of all: there is no logical procedure to get from the organized data to the generalizations and explanatory principles-we need imagination, as the theories are underdetermined by the data.
Falsificationist methods include such rules as "first, get clear about the empirical consequences of the theory you entertain; if you can't derive empirical predictions from it, then recast the theory in a way that will enable you derive predictions from it; if you can't recast the theory, then discard it; next, check whether the predicted consequences do obtain, if they don't, then reject or adjust the theory, but if they do, then stay on the outlook for falsifications." Falsificationism worked well in some respects, but not in others. It worked well, insofar as it urged scientists to formulate theories that could in principle be refuted by counter examples and counter evidence.
But it didn't work, insofar as it offers no rules for what to do in order to confirm a theory.
Although discussions about these methods are interesting in their own right, they are also rather abstract and at quite some remove from actual scientific and humanistic practices. In order to discuss the notion of method in a way that connects more nearly with actual practises, we need further distinctions. First, as already hinted at, methods are geared towards specific aims. The method of applying a thermometer aims at finding out temperatures, it doesn't aim at finding out velocities. The method of applying penicillin aims at fighting bacterial infections, it doesn't aim at fighting mental depressions. Second, methods specify rules that must be applied if the aim is to be attained. The method of applying a thermometer specifies how the thermometer is to be applied. For instance, if it is a thermometer for gauging out door temperatures, the thermometer should be in contact with the out door air; but if it is a thermometer for gauging temperatures of human bodies, it should be in contact with certain bodily parts, and not with others. The method of applying penicillin specifies how, when and where the drug is to be administered. Third, methods can be differentially successful in attaining their aims-if two methods are geared towards the same aim, the one may be more reliable than the other. One type of thermometer may be more reliable than another; one kind of penicillin more effective than an other.
It should be noted that a method may but need not consist of a great number of rules, may but need not involve rules that are very difficult to apply, may but need not involve rules that must be mastered through some training schema. The method for measuring the speed of light consists of many rules, many of which will be difficult to follow, and many of which will have to be mastered through some training schema.
The method for figuring out whether one stone is bigger than another may, by contrast, consist of one simple rule: looking. This rule isn't hard to follow, and it requires no specialized training. Of course, if two stones are differently shaped and of roughly equal size, this method won't secure a result. In that case another method should be applied, for example the respective immersion of the stones in a fixed volume of water in a container; the stone that raises the water level most, is the bigger of the two. (One may worry that looking is not a 'method'. However, on my definition, it is a method. For it is geared towards an aim, viz. figuring out the shapes and colours and positions of middle-sized objects. It consists of rules, such as: having one's eyes opened, and looking in the direction of the object or objects.)
What are the methods of the humanities? Given the multiplicity of aims mentioned in the previous section, we must expect a multiplicity of methods. Which is exactly what we find. It will be impossible to describe, for each of the aims that are connected with the objects of the humanities, which methods are used. I therefore restrict myself for each of the objects to one or two methods geared toward one or two aims. Before turning to this, I need to touch a general matter that is of great importance to all of the methods that are wielded in the humanities. What is so reassuring about science is that its methods can repeatedly be employed by different persons, at different times and at different places. Because of this, the outcomes of the employment of a method transcend the level of personal divination or subjective feeling, as the outcomes can be tested, or verified, or corroborated by other persons using the same method. Do the methods applied in the humanities have this reassuring quality? This is a very big question that I cannot possibly deal with here. What I can say, and what I think must be said, is that insofar as the humanities apply rules, and since it is the nature of rules that they can re-applied (by different persons, at different times, to both the same and other materials), this invites us to make a presumption in favour of the methods used in the humanities. Whether these methods are all equally reliable, and whether they are as reliable as the methods of the natural sciences, is a very large matter that I won't go into. My present point is only that the methods of the humanities must initially be presumed to be reliable-the onus of proof is on the person who claims the methods to be unreliable.
I now turn to a number of methods, of which I can only provide the barest of sketches.
[a] Sentence meaning. of isolation' as they may be called. Also: finding out which grammatical roles which words can have in a language: which words can and which can't play the subject-role, which can and which can't play the predicate role, which words are substantives, which are adjectives and adverbs, which are count words, etc. There is a myriad of rules to follow if one wants to find out a language's grammar.
There appears to be no sharp borderline between the each and every day ways method for estimating the age of an object, or methods used for sequencing DNA, etc..
[b] Word meaning. Suppose we hit upon a word that we don't know-even though we are familiar with the language to which we presume the word belongs. Can we apply a method, rules we can apply, to find out the meaning of that word? Of course. We can ask others, we can consult a dictionary. If that doesn't help we can collect sentences in which the same word is used, and so get a sense of the context in which the word is used (the context of ship building, or computer programming, or abstract metaphysics, or cricket). Something like that is what lexicologists do when they make a dictionary for foreign and so far undescribed languages. In order to figure out the meaning of an unknown word in the absence of a dictionary, it is also relevant to find out to what the speaker commits himself when he uses that word in a variety of sentences in that language. Again these methods are very different from methods used in the natural sciences.
[c] Speaker's meaning. Looking about for methods that enable us to find out speaker's meaning lead us away from the methods that average language users, grammarians, lexicologists and other linguists enable them to find out about sentence and word meaning. In the preponderance of cases knowing the meaning of a sentence will be a necessary but insufficient requirement for knowing the speaker's meaning.
So the first thing to do, if one wants to know a speaker's meaning, is to get to know the meaning of the sentence(s) that he uses. It is telling that Grice, who brought so much intelligence to the topic of speaker's meaning, never indicated how to go on from there-he never specified a method for doing that. He assumed that we more or less know how to do that, even if we cannot explicate the rules we follow. But here, as before, in most ordinary life contexts we do know the speaker's meaning, i.e. we know what he implicated, we grasp his illocutionary intentions, and often we also have a decent sense of his perlocutionary intentions.
Often we are confident about these things because we know the speaker or author, and know about his ways with words (is he a straight talker, or is he prone to making implicit suggestions, etc.); and perhaps we know something about his general outlook on things so that we can be somewhat confident about his intentions; or because we heard the entire speech, or read the whole book, or perhaps even more than that; or because of specific contextual clues we are aware of (we know who the audience was, and the occasion on which the speech was given; or the circumstances under which the text was written, etc.); as well as the culturally dependent modes of expression that we know of.
If we are not confident, we can ask the speaker or the author what he implicated, or what his intentions were. If they are unavailable, we will have to go by the clues that I mentioned in the previous paragraph, as well as by many others.
Highly relevant among the clues is the genre to which the text from which the sentences are taken, belongs, or must be presumed to belong: is it a historical report, a literary essay, a novel, a poem, a propagandistic text, or yet something else? Every genre requires it own approach and its own rules of exegesis. It is the traditional task of hermeneutics to formulate those rules. 33 Often ego-documents of authors will provide clues as well. So there is a welter of things to attend to if one aims to grasp the speaker's meaning. Again, these ways of going about are very different from the ways of going about in the sciences.
We should not suppose that even if insistent scholarly attention is given to the clues mentioned above, and to the hermeneutical rules that have been proposed, we "she intended that this law should improve the entrepreneurial interaction with the Russians", "she intended to show that post-Raphael painting was dead", "she aimed to stir up the public against the government's colonial politics".
Finding out maker's meaning may very often not be a work of great travail. In many ordinary and run of the mill situations, we more or less unreflectively get a decent sense of maker's meaning. Not all situations are ordinary, however, and often
we are clueless about the maker's meaning. In such situations, we may selfconsciously pay explcit attention to the clues mentioned, and study them in an indepth way, i.e. engage in humanistic scholarship.
Again we must not suppose that we will always reach a clear resolution about 
Methods of Ethics.
There is no space to go into this in any detail. Fortunately there is no need either, as the main point is, again, that passing evaluative verdicts on matters aesthetical, logical and moral, cannot possibly be the business of the natural sciences.
If scholarly attention needs to be given to such verdicts, then the humanities are in charge.
All of what I have said about method is still of a high level of abstraction and generality, even if it goes some bit further than the statements of Deductivism and Inductivism. But it is, I aver, or rather hope, of the right level to make the argument that the methods of the humanities are very different from those of the natural sciences at least plausible.
Conclusion
What I have been arguing, then, is that the humanities have objects, aims, and methods that differ from those of the sciences, and that the humanities can deliver 35 See for instance Reid 2002 Reid [1785 : Essays VI, VII, and VIII. 36 Audi 1993. the argument is that the objects of the humanities, in contrast with the objects of the 
